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Introduction
The concept of nature has many connota-
tions, such as has the concept of history of
nature. In many cases, “nature” refers to the
perceptible objects and processes of the sur-
face of the Earth, in so far that these are orig-
inal and not “cultural”, i.e. produced or
influenced by humans. According to the
philosopher Alfred Whitehead, “Nature is
that which we observe in perception through
the senses” (Whitehead 2004:3). This is of
course a very broad and not entirely satisfac-
tory definition, for other reasons because it
does not distinguish between natural objects
and artifacts made by humans. At any rate, it
is largely in this sense we speak of “natural
history”, a term which is generally associated
with the kingdoms of plants, animals and
minerals. To speak in different terms, natural
history comprises the sciences of botany,
zoology and geology; or, from a more recent
perspective, biology and the earth sciences.
However, nature may also refer to much larg-
er and more comprehensive entities, either to
the Earth as a whole or, on an even grander
scale, to the universe at large. It is in the lat-
ter sense that I speak of nature and its evolu-
tion in time, a concept which may be called
“history of nature” in order to distinguish it
from “natural history”. 
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Abstract
This paper discusses in a historical framework the conception of nature as subject to
changes in time. The important reconceptualization of nature from a static to a dynamic
dimension occurred in the late eighteenth century, but did not refer to the underlying
causes, the laws of nature. A deeper understanding of the continual decay of nature over
long spans of time was only obtained in the mid-nineteenth century, with the second law
of thermodynamics. The concept of entropy offered a justification for the irreversible
changes of nature, from more organized states to less organized, and for this reason it
became controversial in some circles. One may imagine that nature is temporal on an even
more fundamental level, namely in the sense that the laws of nature are themselves vary-
ing in time. Suggestions of this kind first appeared in the late nineteenth century, and
more recently they have become quite popular in physics and cosmology. However,
although nature is indeed changing in time, this does not mean that natural science has
become truly historical.
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The subject of this paper is the tempo-
ral dimension of nature as seen from the
perspective of the history of ideas, a topic
covered in admirable breadth by Stephen
Toulmin and June Goodfield (1982). I deal
with some of the proposals made at differ-
ent times that nature has a history and that
her past can be investigated by basically the
same methods as used in ordinary history.
First I offer a very brief and highly selective
review of a few of the early ideas of nature
as evolving in time on a phenomenal level.
I then proceed to some of the later attempts
to account for the irreversibility of natural
evolution in terms of fundamental process-
es as ultimately governed by natural laws.
The relationship between the contrasting
concepts of change and constancy is a clas-
sic theme in the history of ideas, where
change has traditionally been explained
epiphenomenally, on the background of
fixed elements or constants. But what if
these constants – the laws of nature and
their associated constants of nature – are
themselves changing in time? As we shall
see, such ideas have been proposed for
more than a century, although it is only rel-
atively recently that they have been turned
into testable scientific theories. As a kind of
conclusion, I end with a few considerations
concerning the meaning of the concept of
“history of nature” and the relationship
between history and the natural sciences.
From Steno to Herschel
During the later phase of the scientific rev-
olution, in the second half of the seven-
teenth century, it became more common to
think of nature as a historical product,
rather than a fixed and immutable entity
created at the origin of time. Nature was
increasingly seen as something with a past
that had shaped the present, but a past that
was presumably very different from nature
as presently observed. Such ideas, relating
to the surface of the globe, were pioneered
by the Danish natural philosopher Niels
Stensen, better known as Steno, and also by
his contemporary, Robert Hooke, in
England (Rudwick 1985:49-80; Drake
1996). 
It was generally agreed at the time that
if the Earth changed as a whole, it was a
change from the better to the worse, with
the overall trend being one of decay or
degeneration. The decay of nature mani-
fested itself in particular in the rugged sur-
face of the Earth, so obvious to any observ-
er. God had of course created the Earth,
and most philosophers thought that his
creation was originally perfect in shape and
had since deteriorated to its present form,
marked by irregularities such as mountains,
valleys and rivers. This theme was clearly
stated by Hooke, who in a lecture of 1689
spoke of the “many Expressions that denote
a continual decay, and a tendency to a final
Dissolution; and this not only of Terrestrial
Beings, but of Celestial, even of the Sun,
Moon and Stars and of the Heavens them-
selves” (Drake 1996:319). 
The same theme can be found much
earlier. One of the first advocates of the
theory of decay was the English divine
Francis Shakelton, who in a treatise of
1580, A Blazyng Starre, confidently stated
that “this worlde shall perishe and passe
awaie, if we doe but consider the partes
whereof it doeth consist, for doe we not see
the yearth to be changed and corrupted?”
(Jones 1965:23-24). Shakelton found evi-
dence of nature’s decay all over, in moun-
tains, earthquakes and floods, even in “the
constitution of the celestiall worlde,
[which] is not the same that it hath been in
tymes paste, for so much as the Sunne, is
not so farre distant from vs now, as it hath
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been heretofore.” The world was surely
approaching its end:
Let this therefore be a forcible argument
to proue, that the world shall haue an
ende: for so muche as it doeth waxe old,
and euery part thereof doeth feele some
debilitie and weaknesse. For there is
lesse vertue in Plantes hearbes than euer
before. And more feeble strength in
euery liuing creature than euer was
before. And less age in men than euer
was before. It remaineth therefore (of
necessitie) that shortly there shall be an
ende and consumation of the Worlde,
because it is (as it were) subiecte to olde
age, and therefore feeble in euery parte.
(Jones 1965:24)
The early attempts of Steno, Hooke and
their contemporaries to introduce a histor-
ical dimension in the science of the Earth
were hampered by a much too narrow
time-scale based on biblical chronology. In
the seventeenth century everyone agreed
that God had created the world about
4,000 years BC, and this authoritative
time-scale effectively prevented a scientific
reconstruction of how the present state of
nature had gradually come into existence
(Haber 1959). It was only during the era of
the Enlightenment, in the second half of
the eighteenth century, that the orthodox
chronology was seriously questioned and it
was argued that the world has a cosmic his-
tory immensely longer than the one tradi-
tionally adopted. This daring proposal
appeared in different versions, first and
most importantly suggested by a naturalist,
a philosopher, and an astronomer.
The great French naturalist Georges
Louis Leclerc, better known as Comte du
Buffon, was the author of a vast work on
natural history, the Histoire naturelles in an
amazing 44 volumes. In a supplementary
volume of 1778, entitled Époques de la
nature, he reported how he had established
a new age of the Earth, not from studies of
the Bible, but experimentally. Assuming
that the Earth was originally formed in a
hot molten state, he estimated by means of
model experiments and calculations the
time it had taken to cool to the present
temperature. He arrived at the staggering
figure of 75,000 years, and privately he
concluded that the age of the Earth was
probably closer to a couple of million years
(Albritton 2002:78-88). 
Buffon’s break with the biblical time-
scale was important, and so was his recog-
nition that the history of nature could be
investigated by roughly the same methods
as employed by historians and archaeolo-
gists. He held that the scientist should
appeal only to those natural causes that are
in operation today, namely by examining
the relics which are still around us and
which must be regarded as evidence of ear-
lier eras. In this respect, he may be counted
as a precursor of uniformitarian thought in
geology. In the opening words of the Épo-
ques de la nature, Buffon stated his insight
as follows: 
Just as in civil history we consult war-
rants, study medallions, and decipher
ancient descriptions, in order to deter-
mine the epochs of the human revolu-
tions and fix the dates of moral events,
so in natural history one must dig
through the archives of the world,
extract ancient relics from the bowels of
the Earth, gather together their frag-
ments, and assemble again in a single
body of proofs all those indications of
the physical changes which can carry us
back to the different ages of nature.
(Toulmin and Goodfield 1982:244)
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Whereas Buffon was mostly concerned
with the history of the Earth, the great
philosopher Immanuel Kant took an even
grander view by extending the scope to
cover the entire universe. This he did in a
remarkable work published anonymously
in 1755, aptly titled Allgemeine
Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, a
combined cosmogony and cosmology in
which he presented for the first time a thor-
oughly naturalistic and evolutionary
account of the universe in its totality (Kant
1981). Sure, God had created the universe,
but the job of the Almighty was limited to
the original creation, as the subsequent
development was taken care of by the laws
of nature. What is more, God had not cre-
ated the universe in its present form, for it
had slowly developed from the original
primeval gaseous chaos and done so strictly
in accordance with natural law. 
In Kant’s vision – and it was more a
vision than a scientific theory – creation
took place at all time and simultaneously
with destructive processes. “Creation is
never completed,” he wrote. “It is always
busy in bringing forth more scenes of
nature, new things and new worlds.” Kant’s
universe was dynamic and evolutionary,
but it did not evolve teleologically, towards
some future state or goal. It should rather
be characterized as a steady-state universe,
infinite in space as well as in time. The
great cycles of creation and destruction
might occur endlessly. He eloquently wrote
about “this phoenix of nature, which burns
itself out only to revive from its ashes reju-
venated, across all infinity of times and
spaces.”
If Kant’s view of the heavens was spec-
ulative, the cosmology of the great British
astronomer William Herschel was to a con-
siderable extent based on his careful obser-
vations of stars and nebulae. Although he
was unaware of Kant’s work, he arrived at a
picture of the cosmos which had several
features in common with the one proposed
by the philosopher from Königsberg,
including that it was dynamic and evolu-
tionary. In an important series of papers
from the 1780s, collectively entitled The
Construction of the Heavens, Herschel con-
cluded that creative processes still took
place and that the distant star clusters were,
as he said, “the laboratories of the universe”
in which new stars were continually made
(Hoskin 1963). Furthermore, he realized
that when astronomers look into the
depths of space, they look at the same time
back in cosmic history, which is a conse-
quence of the finite velocity of light. They
will even be able to see distant celestial bod-
ies which no longer exist. “I have looked
further into space than ever human being
did before me,” Herschel wrote. “If those
distant bodies had ceased to exist millions
of years ago, we should still see them, as the
light did travel after the body was gone”
(Lubbock 1933:36).
According to Herschel, the heavenly
bodies were in a state of evolution, from
birth to death, but how could this slow
evolution possibly be recognized empirical-
ly? Evidently, the astronomer could not
focus on a single nebula or star and follow
its development over time. But he could
nonetheless form an evolutionary picture
of the cosmos, namely by collecting data
from different parts of it, some far away
and some closer to Earth. Herschel
expressed this method by way of an analo-
gy. Imagine, he wrote, a garden with a vari-
ety of flowers, some young and some old:
“Is it not almost the same thing, whether
we live succesively to witness the germina-
tion, blooming, foliage, fecundity, fading,
withering, and corruption of a plant, or
whether a vast number of specimens,
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selected from every stage through which
the plant passes in the course of its exis-
tence, be brought at once to our view?”
(Hoskin 1963:115).
Irreversibility and entropy
In the dynamical conception of the cos-
mos, such as expounded in different ver-
sions by Kant and Herschel, creative
processes coexisted with those of a destruc-
tive nature. There was no overall direction
of evolution, neither towards progress nor
towards decay. But processes in nature,
such as we observe them and are familiar
with them, normally proceed in a definite
direction. The acorn may evolve into an
oak tree, but there has never been an
instance of an oak tree which develops the
opposite way, ending up as an acorn. In
other words, natural processes are irre-
versible, and it is this irreversibility that
allow us to distinguish the past from the
present and the future, to use the terms
“before” and “after” correctly. Of course, if
no such distinction existed, neither would
history be possible.
This existence of an “arrow in time” in
natural phenomena could not be explained
by the laws of mechanical physics, which
were largely the only laws of nature known
in the early nineteenth century. These laws
are ahistorical in the sense that they are
symmetric in time and thus do not distin-
guish between past and future. Technically
speaking, the equations of motion are unaf-
fected if the symbol t, denoting the time
parameter, is replaced by – t. If a motion is
time-reversed, it is described by the same
mechanical equations as the original
motion. What was needed was a natural
law with the property that it was as unidi-
rectional as history itself, a law which
accounted for the irreversible changes from
one state to another. Since the dominance
of christianity, European history had been
based on a linear conception of time rather
than the cyclic or recurrent conceptions
favoured by many earlier cultures. In order
to “historicize” nature on a fundamental
level there ought to exist a law of nature
with features corresponding to those found
in human history, an arrow of time corre-
sponding to the unidirectionality found in
natural processes. 
Such a law, a candidate for a time’s
arrow, was discovered in the 1850s in the
form of what is known as the second law of
thermodynamics. This is still the only law
of physics which is inherently evolutionary
and offers a kind of explanation of the
direction of time. The essence of this law,
formulated independently by Rudolf
Clausius in Germany and William
Thomson (the later Lord Kelvin) in
Scotland, is that any closed physical system
will spontaneously evolve in such a way
that it becomes ever more disordered, ever
less structured and less organized.
Thomson spoke of dissipation of energy,
while Clausius introduced the concept of
entropy, a measure of the disorder of a sys-
tem or its content of waste energy.
According to Clausius’ law, the entropy of
a system must necessarily increase, in the
end leading to a state with no life, no order
and no activity, a state known as the “heat
death” or the Wärmetod (Brush 1978;
Kragh 2008).
The prospect of a dying Earth and Sun
was a theme that both frightened and fasci-
nated the Victorian mind, and it was taken
up by several authors and poets, one of the
first being Algernon Charles Swinburne,
who in his poem of 1866, “The Garden of
Proserpine”, expressed the consequence of
the second law as follows:
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Then star nor sun shall waken,
Nor any change of light:
Nor sound of waters shaken,
Nor any sound or sight:
Nor wintry leaves nor vernal,
Nor days nor things diurnal.
Only the sleep eternal
In an eternal night.
This is quite a precise description of the
heat death of the universe.
Although the second law of thermody-
namics offered an explanation of the direc-
tion of time, and thus provided a link
between physics and history, it was contro-
versial for a number of reasons and the sub-
ject of much discussion during the last
decades of the nineteenth century. Among
these reasons was that the law, if applied to
the universe at large, predicted that in the
far future all life and activity would cease.
The universe would end in an equilibrium
state where nothing happened or could
happen, and there was no way to escape
from this pessimistic scenario of what was
effectively a dead cosmos. Although the law
of entropy was a law of evolution, it dif-
fered fundamentally from evolutionary nat-
ural history by being more properly a law
of devolution and decay. According to
Oswald Spengler, the author of the highly
influential Untergang des Abendlandes, it
heralded an end to the world, as in the
non-scientific world views of ancient cul-
tures: “What the myth of Götterdämmerung
signified of old, the irreligious form of it,
the theory of Entropy, signifies to-day –
world’s end as completion of an inwardly
necessary evolution” (Spengler 1980:424).
It is no wonder that many naturalists
considered the law of entropy increase to be
contrary to the more progressive
Darwinian evolution theory. Charles
Darwin, for one, found it intolerable that
the second law challenged his optimistic
belief in greater perfection obtained
through the slow evolutionary process. In
his autobiography, begun in 1876 but only
published posthumously, he referred to
“the view now held by most physicists,
namely, that the Sun with all the planets
will in time grow too cold for life, unless
indeed some great body dashes into the sun
and thus gives it fresh life.” It is, he contin-
ued, “an intolerable thought that he [man]
and all other sentient beings are doomed to
complete annihilation after such long-con-
tinued slow progress” (Darwin 1958:67). A
few other evolutionists went to the extreme
of denying altogether the validity of the
second law, such as did Ernst Haeckel, the
German zoologist and self-styled prophet
of Darwinian evolutionism. As Haeckel
saw it, and spelled it out in detail in his
best-selling Die Welträtsel from 1900,
nature was eternal and ever-progressive. It
added to his dissatisfaction with the second
law that it could be used, and in fact was
used, as an argument for a divinely created
universe, a notion he detested (Kragh
2008:122-127). 
But there were also those who wel-
comed the message of the second law and
saw in it a model, or an inspiration, for cul-
tural and social history. This was the opin-
ion of the American Henry Adams, an
author and professor of history at Harvard.
About the turn of the century, Adam
argued that a science of history could be
based on the general properties of energy
and entropy as discovered by the physical
sciences. He believed that it followed from
the second law, not only that the physical
universe, but also human society, must end
in degradation and death, even though this
prophecy would be distasteful to the evolu-
tionists who preached nothing but eternal
progress (Brush 1978:125-127). Also some
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theologians and Christian writers found
the second law of thermodynamics to be
appealing, primarily because it indicated
that the world was of finite age and on its
way toward dissolution. As they pointed
out, this pessimistic scenario was in basic
agreement with the Bible and the Christian
tradition (Kragh 2008). 
Varying laws of nature
The second law of thermodynamics deals
with the development of nature over time,
but it does not itself depend on time. The
classical notion of the laws of nature was of
course that they were permanent and
immutable, valid for all places and at all
times. They were believed to be islands of
constancy in an ocean of phenomenal
change. To speak of a law of nature, or its
corresponding constant of nature, as vary-
ing in time may seem to border on a con-
tradiction in terms (Balashov 1992). Still,
such heretical ideas were suggested by a few
thinkers in the late nineteenth century. The
first to do so was possibly the American sci-
entist and philosopher Charles Sander
Peirce according to whom everything in
nature, including the laws of nature, were
characterized by an element of chance. The
laws shared the evolutionary feature of the
material world in the sense that they varied
in time, although Peirce did not say how
and only discussed the possibility in a very
general way.
A few decades later a somewhat similar
line of thought was defended by the
British-American mathematician and
philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, who
made it part of his general process philoso-
phy. In his main work of 1929, Process and
Reality, Whitehead argued for a world view
where processes were of higher ontological
status than objects and where everything
was in a state of flux, including the laws of
nature. A few years later he elaborated:
Since the laws of nature depend on the
individual characters of the things con-
stituting nature, as the things change,
then correspondingly the laws will
change. ... The modern evolutionary
view of the physical Universe should
conceive of the laws of nature as evolv-
ing concurrently with the things consti-
tuting the environment. Thus the con-
ception of the Universe, as evolving
subject to fixed laws regulating all
behaviour should be abandoned
(Whitehead 1933:143).
To Whitehead, a thorough-going process
philosophy must also include a new picture
of God, a process theology. The God of
Whitehead and later process theologians
(such as Charles Hartshorne and John
Cobb) shares with the physical world a
measure of temporality. He is influenced by
events in nature, and “It is as true to say
that God creates the World, as that the
World creates God” (Whitehead 1929:
528). 
The unorthodox ideas of Peirce and
Whitehead are of great philosophical – and
theological – interest, but they were foreign
to science as usually conceived. For this rea-
son they made almost no impact at all on
the physicists and other scientists, who felt
no need to introduce a temporal perspec-
tive on the laws of nature. 
In a scientific context this idea was first
introduced by the British theoretical physi-
cist Paul Dirac, a Nobel laureate of 1933.
In a paper of 1936, he suggested that the
gravitational constant appearing in
Newton’s universal law of gravity might be
slowly decreasing in cosmic time.
Generalizing the hypothesis, he explained
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in a lecture three years later that the laws of
nature were evolutionary rather than fixed
once and for all: “At the beginning of time
the laws of Nature were probably very dif-
ferent from what they are now. Thus we
should consider the laws of Nature as con-
tinually changing with the epoch, instead
of as holding throughout all space-time”
(Dirac 1939:139; Kragh 1990:227-239).
Although Dirac’s heterodox idea was
pretty much ignored at the time, more
recently the general hypothesis of varying
constants of nature – and hence of varying
laws of nature – has aroused considerable
attention and is nowadays seriously investi-
gated by many physicists and cosmologists.
The shift in attitude appeared in the late
1990s, after a team of physicists and
astronomers announced that analysis of
spectroscopic data from distant quasars
indicated that one or more of the funda-
mental constants of physics had been
smaller in the cosmological past (Barrow
2002). Although these results were contra-
dicted by other experiments, they had the
effect of highlighting the question of vary-
ing natural constants. Not only was the
possible variation of the gravitational con-
stant reconsidered, so was the possible
change of other constants, such as the ele-
mentary electrical charge and the speed of
light. The outcome of this line of research
is still uncertain and so far there is no
strong empirical evidence for constants of
nature changing in time. On the other
hand, neither can the case be ruled out.
The present situation is that it remains a
possibility that one or more of the con-
stants do vary in time and in this sense
reflect the history of the universe.
If the hypothesis of evolutionary fea-
tures in the theories and laws of nature is
uncertain, and to some extent speculative,
this is not the case on the ontological level,
when it comes to understand the con-
stituents of nature, the atoms and sub-
atomic particles of which ordinary matter is
made up. Indeed, atomic and particle
physics has long ago acquired a historical
dimension, at least in the limited sense that
atomic particles are now recognized to be
historical products, formed in the past and
destined to disappear in the future.
This insight stands in stark contrast to
the classical notion of atomism, according
to which atoms are permanent and
immutable bodies – unhistorical, so to
speak. Although the idea was only substan-
tiated and turned into a viable physical the-
ory in the 1930s, it can be found half a cen-
tury earlier. During the Victorian era a few
chemists and physicists speculated that the
atoms of the chemical elements were the
products of what they called “inorganic
Darwinism”. 
In a visionary address of 1886, the
British chemist William Crookes suggested
that the elements were “the gradual outcome
of a process of development, possibly even of
a ‘struggle for existence’” (Crookes
1886:568). He likened the method of the
chemist to that of the archaeologist or
ancient historian, in the sense that both
groups needed to rely on relics in order to
understand the past. This was the same point
that Buffon had made more than a century
earlier, but Crookes was apparently unaware
of his French precursor. Referring to the
spectra from the stars and those produced in
the laboratory, he called them “autograph
inscriptions from the molecular world”. But
the inscriptions were written in a strange and
baffling tongue which had to be deciphered,
just as the strange hieroglyphic language of
the ancient Egyptians had been deciphered
by means of the Rosetta Stone.
Crookes’ ideas were bold and specula-
tive, but in the twentieth century they were
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vindicated and turned into a quantitative
theory of how the elements had come into
existence in the cosmic past and can now
be considered fossils from which this past
can be reconstructed. Today it fully accept-
ed that the material constituents of nature
are historical products and that they con-
tinue to take part in the history of the uni-
verse. This line of reasoning, sometimes
known as “nuclear archaeology”, has been
of singular importance in the development
of modern cosmology (Kragh 2007:161-
163).
Is nature truly historical?
I have been concerned with the temporal
evolution of nature, both with regard to its
laws and its constituents, and I have con-
sidered the analogy between history and
the temporal change of nature which was
first highlighted by Buffon more than 200
years ago. Although the analogy is of con-
siderable interest, it should not be adopted
uncritically. Nature has a history, but from
this fact it does not follow that the history
of nature is just another branch of ordinary
history. In which sense, more precisely, is it
justified to speak of nature in historical
terms?
From a methodological point of view
the methods of the historian do not differ
fundamentally from the methods of the sci-
entist concerned with the past of nature,
whether this past is related to the organic or
the inorganic realms. In both cases the cru-
cial element is the present existence of
sources or documents from the past, relics
that properly interpreted can tell us about
conditions that no longer exist and cannot
be recovered. Whereas explanations in the
physical sciences are normally causal, infer-
ences from a cause to a future effect, in the
history of nature the relevant argument is
not so much prediction as it is retrodiction,
that is, to start with observed effects and
then to infer from them the causes in the
past that shaped them.
But one should beware not to exagger-
ate the similarity between the history of
nature and the history of human societies,
for there are also historical methods that we
cannot adopt in the study of nature’s past.
Because the historian is a human being he
can mentally move back to the past and try
to identify himself with the historical actors
– he can imagine himself as one of those
actors and in this way obtain a kind of
empathic understanding or feeling of what
they thought and did. This is obviously not
a possibility for the scientist trying to
understand the past of nature. It is just not
possible to imagine being a dinosaur and
even less imagining being a molecule.
The French historian Marc Bloch was
aware of the analogy between scientific
inference and historical method, but he
also noted the differences. In a discussion
of the legitimacy of speaking of the possi-
bility of past events, he wrote: “When the
historian asks himself about the probability
of a past event, he actually attempts to
transport himself, by a bold exercise of the
mind, to the time before the event itself, in
order to gauge its chances, as they appeared
upon the eve of its realization” (Bloch
1953:125). Such mental transportation is
outside the possibility of the scientist, but
then it is not necessary either. For the sci-
entist can and will rely on the laws of
nature and methods of science, which in
many ways is a superior approach and one
that the historian cannot follow to any
extent.
To express the matter in a slightly dif-
ferent way, it is only in the case of history
of nature that developments are law-gov-
erned or nomological. Predictions as well as
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retrodictions depend on phenomena fol-
lowing laws or regularities, and whereas
this is the case in nature it is generally not
the case with the human actions and
thoughts that to a large extent constitute
ordinary, civic or cultural, history. To put it
differently, we can explain the past of
nature by referring to causes and laws, but
the human actors of history are not bound
in a similar way; they can act freely, and
often do so, they have motives and inten-
tions for doing as they do. Intentionality is
basically restricted to human actors and is
not to be found in nature. There are
processes and changes in nature, just as
there are in the human world, but they are
much less contingent and they occur
because they must occur under the circum-
stances, not because nature wants them to
occur of because they fulfill a purpose. 
In brief, and to conclude, to speak
of the historicity of nature is really only to
say that nature is subject to evolution and
change in time. It is only historical in a lim-
ited sense, not in the full and genuine sense
that we know from the history of culture
and human societies.
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